Abstract. Compiled Java programs may be downloaded from the World Wide Web and be executed on any host platform that implements the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). However, in general it is impossible to check the origin of the code and trust in its correctness. Therefore, standard implementations of the JVM contain a bytecode veri er that statically checks several security constraints before execution of the code. We have formalized large parts of the JVM, covering the central parts of object orientation, within the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. We have then formalized a speci cation for a Java bytecode veri er and formally proved its soundness. While a similar proof done with paper and pencil turned out to be incomplete, using a theorem prover like Isabelle/HOL guarantees a maximum amount of reliability.
Introduction
The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is an abstract machine consisting of a memory architecture and an instruction set. It is part of the Java language design developed by Sun Microsystems and serves as a basis for Java implementations. However, it also can be used as intermediate platform for other programming languages, since the JVM works independently of Java. The corresponding compiler then generates architecture-independent JVM code instead of machine code for a speci c host platform. This approach allows execution of compiled JVM code on any host platform that implements the JVM. However, this advantage does not come without risks. One can download any JVM code from the World Wide Web, and in general it is impossible to check the origin of the code and trust in its correctness.
The Java Virtual Machine Speci cation (short JVMS) LY96] describes a set of static and structural constraints that must hold for the code to assure safe execution, and requires that the JVM itself veri es that these constraints hold. However, this is not a formal speci cation, and it is in the nature of informal descriptions to contain ambiguities or even inconsistencies. Our goal is to give a fully formal speci cation of the JVM and a bytecode veri er that overcomes ? Research supported by DFG project Bali. this problem. We think that this work can be useful in several aspects: on the one hand it allows the formal investigation of central concepts of the JVM, such as the correctness of the bytecode veri er and compiler veri cation; on the other hand it may serve as reference speci cation that is more accurate than the informal description.
Formalizing a real life programming language is a very complex task and it is likely that an approach done with paper and pencil also will be susceptible to more or less grave errors. Therefore, tool assistance is required to reach a maximum amount of reliability. A theorem prover like Isabelle/HOL Pau94,Isa] o ers valuable support in developing consistent speci cations and correct proofs.
To avoid the execution of incorrect JVM code, several veri cation strategies for JVM code may be used, for example: has implemented a so called defensive JVM using the theorem prover ACL2. In this approach runtime checks are performed to guarantee a type-safe execution of the code. -The JVMS LY96] describes Sun's implementation of a bytecode veri er, where most of the type-checking is done statically but several parts are delayed until runtime. has developed a speci cation for an extended bytecode veri er, where all type-checking is done statically. The speci cation of a bytecode veri er in Isabelle/HOL presented in this paper follows Qian's work. However, our formalization of the operational semantics Pus98] has been done independently of Qian's approach. Therefore we had to deviate from Qian's work in several points to make it t to our approach.
There are several other approaches to formalize (parts of) the JVM (see Ber97], BS98], FM98], Gol97], HBL98], SA98]). As far as we know, our work is the rst to formally prove the soundness of a bytecode veri er using a theorem prover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 brie y introduces Isabelle/HOL. Section 3 describes our formalization of the JVM, in particular the representation of runtime data and the de nition of an operational semantics for the JVM instructions. In section 4 we introduce the notion of static welltypedness and give a formal speci cation for a bytecode veri er. Section 5 de nes the notion of soundness for a bytecode veri er and sketches the corresponding soundness proof. In section 6 we discuss two extensions we have added to the speci cation, and section 7 summarizes our results and outlines future work.
2 Isabelle/HOL Isabelle Pau94,Isa] is a generic theorem prover that can be instantiated with di erent object logics. The formalization and proofs described in this paper are based on the instantiation for Higher Order Logic, called Isabelle/HOL. Subsequently we give an overview over the basic types and functions used in this paper.
Isabelle's type system is very similar to that of ML, with slight syntactic di erences: function types are denoted by 1 ) 2, where 1 ) 2 ) : : : ) n may be abbreviated as 1, 2,: : :] ) n. Product types are written as . Functions are preferably de ned in a curried style (i.e. f a b c). Occasionally we have to de ne uncurried functions f (a, b, c) ; this is due to restrictions of Isabelle's package for well-founded recursive functions.
The basic types bool, nat and int are prede ned. Isabelle/HOL also o ers the polymorphic types set (with the usual set operators) and list. The list constructors are ] (`nil') and x#xs (`cons'). The functions hd xs and tl xs return the head and tail of a list. The i-th list element is written xs ! i, length xs computes the length of a list, and set xs converts a list into a ( nite) set. We also have map f xs to apply a function to all elements of a list, and zip xs ys takes two lists and returns a list of pairs.
Inductive datatypes can be de ned by enumerating their constructors together with their signature. For example, the prede ned datatype for optional values looks as follows: option = None j Some In Isabelle/HOL, all functions are total. Partiality can be modeled using the prede ned`map' type which is de ned as follows:
We use !! of type ; , ] ) for`partial' function application. Whenever f x = Some y then f !! x = y. In the case of None the result will be an unknown value arbitrary, de ned as "x. False (where " is Hilbert's description operator).
Throughout this paper, we write logical constants in sans serif, whereas variables and types appear in italic.
3 The Java Virtual Machine VM code is stored in so called class les. If the code is produced by compilation of a Java program, each Java class is translated into a separate class le. Similar to Java classes, a JVM class le de nition contains information about inheritance and implementation relations, as well as eld and method de nitions. Method code consists of a sequence of JVM instructions (bytecode). The machine model of the JVM knows di erent memory areas for runtime data: a heap stores runtime objects and a frame stack contains state information for each active method invocation. Each method frame has its own operand stack and local variables array. Similar to Java, the JVM has an exception mechanism to treat error conditions. In our formalization, we consider a set of prede ned exceptions, but do not yet treat exception handling.
We have formalized large parts of the JVM, including the class le structure and the operational semantics for a subset of JVM instructions covering the central parts of object orientation. Due to lack of space, we cannot present the entire formalization that can be found in Pus98,NOP]. However, we introduce the main ideas of our approach.
JVM class les
The rst part of a class le consists of the constant pool, a kind of symbol table containing name and type information. It then contains a ag indicating whether the class le describes an interface or a class, several pointers to constant pool entries returning the names of the current class, its superclass and direct superinterfaces, and nally the eld and method de nitions: You may have noticed that in contrast to our formalization, the JVMS LY96] does not require values to be tagged with their runtime types. However, our approach does not impose any restrictions on possible implementations, because the type information is not used to determine the operational semantics of (correct) JVM code. We use the type tags only to state and prove the correctness of the bytecode veri er, where the runtime types are checked against the static type information.
Operational Semantics of JVM Instructions
The JVMS LY96] describes the operational semantics for each instruction in the context of a JVM state where several constraints hold, e.g. there must be an appropriate number of arguments on the operand stack, or the operands must be of a certain type. If the constraints are not satis ed, the behaviour of the JVM is unde ned. In our approach, we formalize the behaviour of JVM instructions with total functions. If a state does not satisfy the constraints of the current instruction, e.g. if an element should be popped from an empty operand stack, the result will be the unknown value arbitrary.
We have structured the instructions in several groups of related instructions, describing each by its own execution function. This makes the operational semantics easier to understand, since every function only works on the parameters that are needed for the corresponding group of instructions: instr = LAS load and store j CO create object j MO Execution of a JVM instruction transforms the machine state. The machine state is formalized as a triple consisting of an exception ag, an object heap, and a frame stack. For each active method invocation, there exists a frame containing its own operand stack, a list of local variables, the name of the current class, a reference to the current method, and the program counter: JVM code may be produced by incorrect compilers, or may be corrupted during network transmission, or even may be hand-coded in a malicious intention. Therefore, standard implementations of the JVM contain a bytecode veri er that statically checks several security constraints before execution of the code. One main aspect of the bytecode veri er is to statically derive the types of possible runtime data and check that all instructions will get arguments of the correct type.
Static types
As Qian has pointed out in his work Qia98], the attempt to statically type-check JVM code requires the introduction of reference type sets instead of single types. This is due to the fact that, as a result of a branching instruction, a program point may have multiple preceeding program points. These predecessor points are allowed to contain values of di erent types. 3 In this case, the types of the two branches have to be merged to the rst common supertype. However, the JVM allows multiple inheritance of interfaces, and therefore this supertype is not necessarily unique.
Qian 
Static Well-typedness
A bytecode veri er has to infer type information for each instruction and then check if the method code is well-typed. In our speci cation, well-typedness is checked with respect to a given type. A correct implementation of that specication must then compute a type that is well-typed according to the speci cation.
We de ne a type checking predicate that checks whether an instruction at a certain program point is well-typed with respect to a given method type. Additionally, it checks several other constraints, e.g. an index to local variables must not be greater than the number of local variables and the program counter must remain within the current method. These constraints are indispensable to carry out the soundness proof for the bytecode veri er. The type-checking predicate makes a case distinction over the instruction to be executed at the current program point. In case of Get eld, the instruction is well-typed if the following predicate holds: Since that next instruction has possibly other predecessors, its type information is not necessarily equal to new type, but rather must cover it. The above predicate enforces that the incremented program counter pc+1 does not exceed the code length maxpc. The class fc must be de ned and must contain a eld with name fn according to the constant pool entry. The stack must not be empty and the top stack element must contain a reference type convertible to the type of fc. Finally, the next instruction must expect a type according to the eld descriptor fd on top of the operand stack.
Similarly to the execution function exec, we de ne a predicate wt instr that selects the appropriate well-typedness predicate for each group of instructions. We extend the notion of well-typedness to methods, classes, and programs: at the beginning of a method body, the operand stack must be empty, and the local variables must contain values according to the type of the current class cn ?! wt method CFS cn (snd ml) rd ins (? ml)
A 5 Soundness of the Bytecode Veri er Speci cation A bytecode veri er (or more abstract: a type system) statically determines the types of all runtime data. A type system is sound, if the statically predicted type gives a correct approximation of a runtime value produced during execution. 5 In this section, we will show that our speci cation of a bytecode veri er is sound. For a concrete implementation of a bytecode veri er, it then remains to be proved that it satis es our speci cation.
Correct Approximation of Runtime Values
In our formalization, runtime values carry some type information (see x3.2), whereas Qian has to go through the code and assign a type tag to each value depending on the instruction it has been created by. However, he only gives an informal motivation that indeed all runtime values can be associated with a tag. Therefore, our correctness relation between runtime data and static types di ers from that given 
Soundness Proof
Qian states a soundness theorem saying that for statically well-typed bytecode, the correctness relation between runtime values and static types of the current operand stack and local variables will be preserved in every execution step. However, his proof given in Qia97] remains sketchy, and it turnes out that the theorem cannot be proved in the given form. A stronger proof invariant has to be formulated, assuring the correctness not only of the current operand stack and local variables, but the correctness of the entire state containing all active invocation frames. In particular, the method executed in the (n+1)-th frame must correspond to a method invocation of the n-th frame. Additionally, the frame itself must be well-formed, i.e. the class cn is de ned, the method reference ml points to an existing method, and the program counter pc points to an instruction inside the method code: correct frame :: class les,heap,state type,frame] ) bool correct frame CFS hp (ST,LT) (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) def = approx stk CFS hp stk ST^approx loc CFS hp loc LT^is class CFS cn9 rd ins. get methods (CFS !! cn) ml = Some (rd,ins)^pc < length ins The predicate correct frames checks whether a method reference mln+1 and a return descriptor rdn+1 (belonging to frame fn+1) t to the next frame fn of the frame stack. If the frame stack is empty, the method must have return type void (i.e. return descriptor V). If there exists a frame fn, the last executed instruction must have invoked method mln+1 with return type rdn+1. Besides that, fn itself must be correct. These checks are performed recursively on the remaining stack: correct frames :: class les,heap,prog type,return desc,method loc,frame list] ) bool correct frames CFS hp rdn+1 mln+1 ] = (rdn+1=V) correct frames CFS hp rdn+1 mln+1 (fn#frs) = let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) = fn; (rd,ins) = get methods (CFS !! cn) !! ml; cp = get cpool (CFS !! cn); (ST,LT) = ( cn ml) ! pc in 9mi c k l. pc = k+1^ins ! k = MI mi^extract meth cp mi = (c,mln+1,rdn+1,l)ĉ orrect frame CFS hp (pop rd CFS rdn+1 ST, LT) fnĉ orrect frames CFS hp rd ml frs
The entire state is correct, if an exception has been thrown or the frame stack is empty. In case of a nonempty frame stack, the heap must be correct, the top level frame fn+1 must be correct, and the remaining frame frs must be correct with respect to the method mln+1 executed on the top level frame and its return descriptor rdn+1: It says that for a set of well-formed class les CFS that are statically well-typed with program type , program execution in a correct state leads to correct states '. 6 This means that starting from a correct initial state (invoking the main method of the executed class), all possible runtime data for a program CFS is correctly approximated by its static type . Inspecting the de nitions of welltypedness and correct approximation, we are able to conclude that all required constraints will be satis ed at runtime, e.g. in case of the Get eld instruction, the top operand stack element will be a reference value Null or Addr a.
The proof of the main theorem has been carried out by induction over the transitive closure of the execution function. Then the preservation of the correctness property for a single execution step had to be shown by case distinction over the instructions. We have then developed separate lemmas for each instruction.
6 Extensions to the Bytecode Veri er Speci cation A bytecode veri er implementing our speci cation rejects bytecode that would not do any harm at runtime. Of course, it is not possible to build a complete static type system, since static well-typedness is undecidable. However, we can eliminate two unnecessary restrictions in our speci cation: instructions that are not reachable, i.e. dead code, may be neglected during type-checking, and operand stack values may be of type Unusable if they are not used for further computation. In fact, optimizing compilers will detect dead code and eliminate it. However, bytecode may stem from other sources, e.g. may be hand-written. Besides that, we wanted to check the modularity of our proofs: a modi cation of our specication should not entail too much adaptions of our proof script.
Therefore, we have de ned a predicate reach :: instr list,nat] ) bool. It checks whether a certain program point may be reached from the starting point. We have then replaced in our de nition of wt method the premise pc < length ins by reach ins pc. Due to this, we had to adapt our proof invariant: a correct state now only contains reachable program points. We could then prove the new correctness statement by using an additional lemma, stating that any reachable state leads to another reachable state. The existing lemmas were not a ected.
Our second extension, the introduction of possibly Unusable values on the operand stack, did not impose any changes to the proofs at all. It strikes positively that the formalization gets more readable, since operand stack and local variables are now treated in a uniform way, admitting both values of type any.
Results and Further Work
We have given a fully formal speci cation for the JVM and a bytecode verier, and then formally proved the soundness of the bytecode veri er using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. The formalization of the JVM class le structure and the operational semantics comprises about 1000 lines, the speci cation of the bytecode veri er took another 500 lines. The proof scripts contain approximately 2400 lines. It took about 6 month to develop the formalization and conduct the proof. The most complex parts of the proof concern the instructions for eld access and method invocation, where the existence of a eld or method for some static type must assure that an appropriate eld or method can be found at runtime.
Isabelle/HOL turned out to be an adequate instrument to model real life programming languages such as Java (see also ON98]). It is obvious that we had to make certain restrictions in this rst approach to formalize the JVM. For example we do not consider the size of instructions and its operands and use instead abstract datatypes. These abstractions can be re ned in further development steps of our formalization.
As next steps, we want to extend our formalization and the proof to subroutine call and object initialization. The work done by Qian Qia98], Stata and Abadi SA98], and Freund and Mitchell FM98] showed that these constructs form the most complex part of bytcode veri cation, and therefore are worth a fully formal investigation using a theorem prover.
